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Abstract: The common wisdom is that Popper's critical rationalism, a meth-
od aimed at knowledge validation through falsification of theories, is inade-
quate for managers in organizations. This study falsifies this argument in 
three phases: first, it specifies the obstructers that prevent the method from 
being employed; second, the critical rationalist method is adapted for strate-
gic management purposes; last, the method and the hypotheses are tested via 
action research. Conclusions are that once the obstructers are omitted the 
method is applicable and effective. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In a previous paper, presented at OLKC 20102, we targeted the confrontation of the manageri-
al unawareness problem. Assuming that any decision-maker acts upon a theory he or she has 
of the world, the unawareness problem is defined as a state in which this theory is false whilst 
the theory holder does not imagine the very possibility of that falsehood. The consequences, 
so we argued, have a great hazardous potential since the entire decision-making process rests 
upon a tenuous basis. 
Yet the problem is paid a marginal attention in the management literature (compared to other 
decision-making problems, e.g. ambiguity or uncertainty), mainly from a cognitive perspec-
tive that explains why the "true" theory is ignored. We argued that once a different perspec-
tive is employed, namely the epistemological one, we can lean upon a large body of 
knowledge from the philosophy-of-science field. In this sense the philosopher Karl Popper 
was distinguished as purposively addressing the exact notion of unawareness through Critical 
Rationalism (CR). In brief, Popper (1961) sees no prospect in enhancing the discovery abili-
ties that sustain the theory formation; instead he focuses on the phase of justification, in 
which the theory is tested. By applying logical vehicles for testing, Popper claims, I can avoid 
the cognitive trap whatsoever and construct a much more objective and instructible method.  
The method respects three principles: falsification, deduction and active criticism. The princi-
ple of falsification stands against the notion of verification by claiming that a theory can only 
be falsified but can never be verified, so a theory is nothing but tentative. The principle of 
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deduction provides the procedure of falsification: from the (unverifiable) theory an event is 
deduced that the theory prohibits, and if the event is contradicted in reality the theory is falsi-
fied. The principle of active criticism is about the active quest for falsification, i.e. that the 
scientist should expose the theory to as tough as possible tests in order to detect problems. 
The activeness and the deductive logic counteract the cognitive unawareness. 
Given these qualities and the equivalent need, can the CR method serve the management dis-
cipline against unawareness? The common wisdom provides a negative answer. We aggregat-
ed the various (but consistent) objections under what we have titled the Inadequacy Argu-
ment. In summary, the Argument is twofold:  
1. The strategic environment that surrounds the organization does not lend itself to theo-
rization in the notion implied by CR because every constellation is unique, thus one 
cannot speak of "universal laws" to be falsified. 
2. The organization cannot test its theories about the environment without influencing 
that environment, thus the test is "contaminated". 
We challenge the Inadequacy Argument. Based on seminal organizational learning traditions 
we constructed the Falsification Obstructers theory (Figure 1), that holds the following ra-
tionale: 
1. Unknowingly, the organization exhibits several fragments of CR among its regular 
learning processes. Over all, it is possible to present the organizational "theoretical 
system" in a Popperian-like structure. 
2. These fragments assemble around two routes of derivation: the left-hand side consti-
tutes the organizational design theory, whilst the right-hand side exhibits the organi-
zation's predictions of the environment (scenarios). 
3. The unawareness, if exists, resides in the Descriptive theory; hence this theory is the 
one to be tested. 
4. Of the two routes, the Inadequacy Argument applies only to the left. No attempt has 
been made to utilize the right route in CR manner. 
 
 
Figure 1. The organization's "Theoretical System"  
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The aims of this research are (1) to corroborate the Falsification Obstructers theory and by 
that to supplant the Inadequacy Argument; we will assume corroboration if the removal of the 
falsification obstructers will enable falsification via the Popperian doctrine (counter to the 
Inadequacy Argument).  (2) To counteract the unawareness problem. 
2 THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
Toward the aims just mentioned we have to design a method that removes the falsification 
obstructers, apply it in real organizational setting and evaluate the impact. The double aim of 
developing an instrument that simultaneously tests a theory and solves a problem merges two 
scientific activities – explanation and design – into one discipline known as design science 
(March & Smith, 1995). 
2.1 The Design-Science Framework 
Walls et al (1992) provide a research framework ("design theory") that manifests the double 
meaning of "design": for one as a product, for two as a process. The framework is exhibited in 
Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. Components of Design Theory (source: Walls et al, 1992) 
The product's components are defined as follows: 
The first component of a design theory dealing with the product of design is a 
set of meta-requirements which describe the class of goals to which the theo-
ry applies. We use the term "meta-requirements" rather than simply require-
ments because a design theory does not address a single problem but a class 
of problems. The second component is a meta-design describing a class of ar-
tifacts hypothesized to meet the meta-requirements. We use "meta-design" 
because a design theory does not address the design of a specific artifact 
(e.g., a payroll system for XYZ corporation) but a class of artifacts (e.g., all 
transaction processing systems). The third component is a set of kernel theo-
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ries from natural or social sciences which govern design requirements. The 
final component is a set of testable design process hypotheses which can be 
used to verify whether the meta-design satisfies the meta-requirements (Walls 
et al, 1992, pp. 42-43; italics in origin). 
And the process' components read: 
The second aspect of a design theory deals with the design process. The first 
component of this aspect is a design method which describes procedure(s) for 
artifact construction. The second is a set of kernel theories from the natural or 
social sciences governing the design process itself. These kernel theories may 
he different from those associated with the design product. The final compo-
nent is a set of testable design process hypotheses which can be used to verify 
whether or not the design method results in an artifact which is consistent 
with the meta-design (Walls et al, 1992, p. 43; italics in origin).  
2.2 The Framework's Instantiation in the Research 
The product is the Popperian method adapted for organizations, and the adaptation constitutes 
the process. The design components are detailed in Table 1. Note that the hypotheses (high-
lighted by italics) encounter both pillars included in the Inadequacy Argument, i.e. the envi-
ronment and the organization (H1 and H2, respectively).  
Table 1. The Design Theory components as instantiated in the research 
Component Design as a product Design as a Process 
Kernel theories Popper's Critical Rationalism 
doctrine. 
The organization theories (means-
ends, theory-of-action, SID, 
organizational learning) that 
underlie the falsification 
obstructers theory. 
Meta-
requirements 
Exclusive justification, deduction-
based falsification, insensitivity to 
psychologism, unequivocal and 
testable criteria for problem 
recognition. 
Not applicable. 
Meta-design/ 
Design method 
Syllogistic structure in which the 
descriptive Theory stands for the 
major premise and the right route 
(scenarios) provides the minor 
premise, the prediction and the 
conclusion. 
Crafting an assortment of 
techniques that confront the 
obstructers along the selected 
route. 
Testable 
design/process 
hypotheses 
H1a. The organization's 
environment can be3 theorized 
in a falsifiable fashion. 
H1b. The right route is capable 
of obtaining unequivocal 
H2. The techniques employed 
throughout the method 
overcome the "mindless 
derivation" and the "mental 
irrefutability" falsification 
obstructers. 
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Component Design as a product Design as a Process 
falsification. 
 
2.3 The Research Method 
The integrated design-explanation objectives pose two major constraints to the research 
method:  
1. The hypotheses testing entail an experiment in which the independent variables (the 
obstructers) are manipulated; so the method should be experimental. 
2. The variables are complicated and multifaceted. 
In order to meet these constraints the Action Research (AR) method was selected. The AR is 
definitely an experimental method (Hatchuel, 2005) which is explicitly recommended for 
methodological innovation purposes (Baskerville & Wood-Harper, 1996). The AR eliminates 
the weakness of laboratory experiments that are limited to simple, isolable variables (Mitroff 
& Mason, 1981), therefore is proper for investigating complex social systems (Argyris, Put-
nam & Smith, 1985).  
AR is a genre rather than a monolithic method (Baskerville & Wood-Harper, 1998). Histori-
cally, the method emerged in the 1940's within the social sciences (sociology and psycholo-
gy). It emphasized the active participation and involvement of the researched objects, in par-
ticular those who have been previously excluded (Baskerville & Wood-Harper, 1998; Kem-
mis & McTaggart, 2000); therefore the method is associated with emancipation (Wadsworth, 
1998). Later it became popular in the field of education and nowadays also in information 
systems development (e.g. Lindgren, Henfridsson & Schultze, 2004) and management (e.g. 
French, 2009/a). Over the time the method has diversified along several streams, including 
"the action research stream that focuses on changing practice, the action science stream for 
conflict resolution, the participatory action research stream for participant collaboration, or 
the action learning stream through experiential learning" (Lau, 1999, p. 162); our research 
affiliates to the first, i.e. "plain" action research.  
Basically the AR consists of two phases: diagnosis and change (Baskerville & Wood-Harper, 
1998). The Canonical Action Research (CAR) model (Susman & Evered, 1978), which is 
shared across many AR variations, is expanded up to five phases (Figure 3). The leading idea 
is the iterative cycle around a client-system infrastructure, defined as "the social system in 
which the members face problems to be solved by action research" (Susman & Evered, 1978, 
p. 588).  
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Figure 3. The cyclical process of canonical action research (source: Susman & 
Evered, 1978, p. 588) 
The AR is applicable for both design science (Järvinen, 2005) and the CR approach (Cunha & 
Figueiredo, 2002). 
2.4 Detailed Research Design by Phases 
Overview: the span of the research has to balance the tension between two considerations. On 
the one hand, the AR method is time-consuming and costly, all the more so when strategic 
consequences are expected. On the other hand, a narrow study faces the risk of over-
singularity. In order to compromise both conflicting constraints the AR is planned to encom-
pass three organizations in two cycles: two organizations in the first cycle, one organization in 
the second cycle.  
Diagnosis: the aims are to realize the "Theoretical System" (Figure 1), to frame the assumed 
obstructers and to characterize the Descriptive Theory in that system (the testing target). Data 
will be collected through one-on-one, in-depth and semi-structured interviews with a small 
but representative sample of decision-makers. Respondents will be asked, sometimes vicari-
ously, what the theory that guides their decisions is, and how they warrant the truth of those 
theories. The data collected through the interviews is dissected to utterances and arranged in 
alignment with the "Theoretical System".  
Action planning: this phase materializes the method's design and builds on the framework 
provided by March & Smith (1995). Like Walls et al (1992), March & Smith divide the de-
sign into product and process. The combination forms the matrix presented in Table 2. The 
phase actualizes the first three components of the Build activity.  
Table 2. A Design Science research framework (edited from: March & Smith, 1995, p. 
255) 
  Research activities (process) 
  
Design science 
Explanatory science 
(hypotheses testing) 
  Build Evaluate Theorize Justify 
Diagnosing 
Identifying or 
defining a problem 
Action planning 
Considering 
alternative courses of 
action for solving a 
problem 
Action taking 
Selecting a course 
of action 
Evaluating 
Studying the 
consequences of 
an action 
Specifying 
learning 
Identifying 
general findings 
Development of 
a Client-system 
infrastructure 
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Research 
outputs 
(product) 
Construct     
Model     
Method     
Instantiation     
 
Action taking: in this phase the method is instantiated, in line with the fourth Build activity. 
This phase is expected to be the longest of the research, since strategic changes in the envi-
ronment that may refute the Descriptive theory usually take time.  
Evaluating: Table 3 presents the applicable evaluation criteria, based on March & Smith 
(1995). 
Table 3. Criteria for evaluation (based on: March & Smith, 1995, p. 261) 
Design 
product 
Evaluation criteria 
Construct Completeness, simplicity, understandability, and ease of use. 
Model Validity, as the result of internal consistency and fidelity with real world 
phenomena. 
Method Operationality (the ability of humans to effectively use the method), 
efficiency, generality, and ease of use. 
Instantiation Efficiency and effectiveness of the artifact and its impacts on the 
environment and its users. 
 
Specifying learning: in this phase we materialize the hypotheses testing. The "Theorize" and 
"Justify" activities that constitute this phase read: 
Discover, or more appropriately for IT research, theorize, refers to the con-
struction of theories that explain how or why something happens. In the case 
of IT research this is primarily an explanation of how or why an artifact 
works within its environment. Justify refers to theory proving. It requires the 
gathering of scientific evidence that supports or refutes the theory (March & 
Smith, 1995, p. 258). 
3 THE FIRST CYCLE: DIAGNOSIS 
3.1 The Participants 
The 1
st
 cycle involved two participants, varied by their motivation to engage and by their 
characteristics. Hereinafter they are identified as IND and EDU. The research was conducted 
at both simultaneously while each is unbeknown to the other, being the researcher the sole 
linking connector. The period in point is 2002-2006, and the following details are updated as 
of the research's outset. 
IND is an Israeli medium high-tech manufacturer of video streaming equipment. The compa-
ny is vertically integrated along its product line, from R&D through production to worldwide 
marketing and sales. Horizontally, however, the company largely depends on the environment 
since its products should be integrated in complex systems beyond the company's control. The 
company consisted of headquarter (HQ) and two SBUs: one engaged in TV broadcasting over 
telephone wires and the other in video encoding (all the three units participated). Short before 
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the research the dot-com bubble had exploded, driving the environment into extreme turbu-
lence during the research.  
IND joined a research project funded by the European Commission, aimed at studying and 
developing knowledge management practices in small and medium enterprises. The research 
was part of this project, so the official project contract covered the researcher-client agree-
ment. It so happened that the research started a few months after the company had crafted its 
strategy, and this accidental proximity made the investigation relevant and vivid. 
EDU is an Israeli academic college of engineering. It is a public NGO, budgeted by the na-
tional Council for Higher Education (CHE). EDU maintains five programs toward an engi-
neering degree, each in a department: mechanical engineering, electronics, bio-technology, 
software and industrial engineering.  
A brief background: up to the 1990s the higher education system in Israel consisted of seven 
research universities, all in big cities. Since demand for academic education has outnumbered 
the supply, the universities could be selective; consequently academic degree remained exclu-
sive, associated with high socio-economic status. The government encountered massive pres-
sure to enhance social mobility through education, meaning more universities; alas, universi-
ties are costly. The CHE adopted another idea: to establish colleges, dedicated solely for 
teaching first degrees (i.e. no research); it was assumed a much cheaper alternative. In order 
to attain another social objective, to boost the periphery, most colleges ought to be located in 
small and distant towns. EDU, among other, was the outcome of this policy: an academic 
school of engineering in northern Israel. At the same time several private colleges were also 
licensed, all in central areas (and with much higher tuition). Consequently, the education sup-
ply has increased significantly in a very short time. The instant increase introduced all the 
academic institutions in Israel (including universities) to an unfamiliar playground: market 
competition. 
For long, public academic institutions around the world have not been associated with com-
petitive thinking; it was strange to the "ivory tower" image. However, major social changes 
did affect the academia (Brown & Duguid, 2000), and business practices – competitive strate-
gy included – made their way into the board room (e.g. Morrison & Mecca, 1989). Neverthe-
less the strategic thinking idea remained unfamiliar with EDU, and when the newly-arrived 
president acknowledged the need for formal strategy he asked for advice. One author pro-
posed to integrate the research within the strategic process, and the president – acquainted 
with academic research, to be sure – accepted. That was the platform on which the researcher-
client agreement was established. 
Strategy is regarded confidential; the participants were explicitly aware of the publicity this 
research would receive, and agreed. Anyway, the lasting of the research made the content 
outdated and competitively valueless.  
Table 4. "ID card" of the 1st cycle's participants 
Alias IND EDU 
Identity High-tech manufacturer Academic college 
Industry Video streaming Higher education 
Ownership Public enterprise Budgeted NGO 
Size (number of 
employees) 
150 250 
Structure Headquarter, two SBUs President, five faculties, 
administration 
Range of activities Vertically integrated: from R&D Pre-academic studies, 1st four-year 
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to selling degree in engineering 
 
3.2 Diagnosis
4
 
IND 
The Theory: the Descriptive theory comprises three types of statements. The first discloses 
the conceptual structure; for instance, subcategories in the customers' market: "The market 
consists of the Telco's and the cables companies". The second reflects the concept attainment, 
i.e. attribution (Bruner et al, 1956): "Video is a psychological need". The third relates the 
concepts by causality: "The product's decline is influenced by both customers and new tech-
nology". 
Problems: the data indicates three problems: mindless derivation, mental irrefutability and 
causal ambiguity. The forth problem suggested in the model, i.e. logical irrefutability, is in-
significant due to the marginality of the Normative theory. The marginality is clearly ex-
claimed in the statement: "The goals are mainly market-driven, this is the leading factor", fol-
lowed by defining values as nonsense and a waste of time.  
Accordingly, the most extensive influence is of the scenarios on the high-level goals. Process 
examples are: "What are the competitors doing and which share of the market each is taking? 
This will determine my choice"; or: "First we look at the market and try to understand its 
trends, and then we look inside and check what we can offer". A content example: "Any 
change in these trends [MPEG, HDTV] will be critical for us. We still don't know whether to 
enter the market or not". 
Below we discuss the three discernible problems. 
Mindless derivation: The prime indication of mindlessness is the unawareness of the very 
existence of scenarios. Although scenarios are exercised in practice, the "espoused theory" is 
in denial: "We didn't use scenarios during the strategic thinking", and "I definitely would not 
consider the method of scenarios". 
Another sign of mindlessness is fragmented scenarios. Table 5 exhibits IND's "consistency 
measure": the extent to which the concepts reappear along the right falsification route. On 
face value the scenarios' derivation is consistent with the Descriptive theory; but the picture is 
misleading. Almost each driving force generates a stand-alone scenario, isolated from the 
others. Consider for example the following two dimensions:  
 The "standards" dimension, by which two scenarios emerge: the triumph of either 
MPEG or Microsoft.  
 The "customers" dimension, with two scenarios: "The Telco's crisis posits two alter-
native courses: one is that they will go bankrupt and be nationalized, the other that 
they will be forced to find new revenues"; therefore – 
"The balance between the Telco's and the cables is critical for our strategy".  
However, no scenario integrates these dimensions (or any of the others) coherently, although 
they all shape a unified reality. 
Table 5. IND's "consistency measure" 
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Market players/Competitors + + + + 
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Regulation + +   
Infrastructure/Value chain + +  + 
Society & Economy +    
 
Mental irrefutability: four facets are detected. One is the commitment to previous predic-
tions, exemplified by the following episode: the firm counted on a five-year forecast, which 
after three years was proved incorrect. Rather than rechecking the underlying theory –  
We have tried to reconstruct a rule that would explain what had happened to 
the market. I assume that "business is as usual", that the forecast should have 
been correct hadn't these nonlinear events occurred. Let's exercise the equa-
tion that will reflect them and get the actual reality. I guess that the backward 
correction applies forward as well. 
The second facet is the availability bias, indicated by three instances. First, the relevance is 
taken for granted; when asked about his first-priority knowledge gap, the interviewee an-
swered: "What are the interdependencies among the forces that are relevant for me". Second, 
each issue is watched by a dedicated taskforce. Third, the environmental feedback relies heav-
ily on current customers, whose perspective is aligned with that of IND in the first place 
(Christensen, 1997/b). 
The third facet represents the self-sealing phenomenon (Argyris, 1976/a): the environmental 
scanning is subordinated to the production capacity. During the aforementioned conversation 
the interviewee declared: "I will ask about HDTV half a year before I'm planning to develop 
the product". A colleague commented: "this schedule is right for you, but the market may dic-
tate a different schedule", to that the interviewee answered: "may be, but I won't decide earlier 
anyway". 
The forth facet is low esteem of the testing capability; when asked about an attribute con-
tained in the Theory (that the market is price-sensitive), the interviewee answered: "We as-
sume that the same attribute will hold in the future. I don't have any way to check it but retro-
actively". 
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Causal ambiguity: clearly the results – especially the market's response to the company's 
products – are the most essential (even if late) measure: "The best indicator, although too late, 
is how the product is accepted in the market". However, the meaning of the results is ambigu-
ous (like the control framework suggests): "We are not alone in the market, so if our product 
is declined the reason may be that a competitor offered a better or a cheaper product". The 
ambiguity prevails in the other way around as well: "the distance between understanding the 
market and transforming this understanding to a product is still long". Likewise the strategy 
officer testified that only after he knew the results he would try to understand what in the 
strategy had caused them. 
Another indicator for causal ambiguity concerns the information collection from the custom-
ers. The interviewees pictured a confused dialogue in which both sides guess what the mar-
ket's signals mean.  
Diagnosis confirmation: the diagnosis was confirmed by a panel assembled of the interview-
ees (except one) and additional staff officers. 
EDU 
The Theory: the descriptive Theory comprises the same three types of statements as in IND. 
The first discloses the conceptual structure; for instance, "The academic competitive arena is 
divided to three leagues: universities, national colleges, and regional colleges". The second 
reflects the concept attainment, i.e. attribution: "Engineering means quantification". The third 
relates the concepts by causality: "More students bring more resources". 
Problems: the prominent problems in EDU are the logical irrefutability (which literally "goes 
without saying") and the mindless derivation. The former reflects the remarkable influence 
that the normative Theory has on the means-ends construct; we do not address this problem. 
The mindless derivation is apparent upon the "consistency measure" (Table 6): the vast ma-
jority of the Theory's concepts are omitted from the initial conditions or the scenarios. Both 
Theory and scenarios exist, but disconnected. 
The mental irrefutability obstructer is neutralized since no attempts at refutation were exer-
cised. The causal ambiguity obstructer was not detected; to the contrary, the interviewees 
were confident about how to attain their goals. Two factors propel this confidence: first, the 
sound normative theory stands as a guideline; second, the reliance on self-experience. For 
example, one interviewee justified her design Theory on her and her children's experience 
basis.  
Table 6. EDU's "consistency measure" 
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Academic leagues +    
[Other] education providers +    
Attractiveness/ Prestige/ Reputation/ 
Diploma/Market's evaluation/Added 
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+    
Budget/Resources/Staff positions +    
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Engineering/Engineers/Graduates +  + + 
Professional knowledge +  + + 
Change rate    + 
Learning abilities +    
Demand for education/Labor market/ 
Society ("the street") 
+   + 
Students/ Students' level/ Students' 
expectations & preferences 
+   + 
Faculty members/Academic challenge +    
Scientific breakthroughs +    
Teaching styles/Teachers-students 
relations/ Educational 
telecommunication 
+  + + 
Information   + + 
 
Diagnosis confirmation: the diagnosis was confirmed by the expanded strategy forum that 
included the senior and the mid management; all the interviewees attended. 
4 ACTION PLANNING 
As noted earlier, only the left falsification route (Figure 1) is assumed to be subject to the In-
adequacy Argument; therefore the intervention targets the right hand-side route, i.e. the sce-
narios. The following structure reflects Table 2. 
4.1 Constructs 
The scenarios' derivation flow constitutes a syllogism, so the first three of the following con-
structs present a syllogistic structure: the Descriptive theory as the major premise, the initial 
conditions as the minor premise and the scenarios as the conclusion. The last construct ("En-
vironment") stands for the basic statement that is compared against the conclusion. 
4.1.1 Descriptive Theory 
The descriptive Theory designates the relevant forces, identifies their attributes and explains 
the interrelationships. Accordingly, the Theory comprises three types of statements:  
 Structure: statements that specify the concepts and the sub-concepts included in the 
Theory; in other words, the theory's structure. Examples: "The world is divided into 
MPEG and non-MPEG" (IND); "'College' is different from 'university'" (EDU).  
 Attribution: statements that ascribe attributes to concepts; for instance: "the technol-
ogy progresses gradually", "The market is price-sensitive" (IND); "Engineers are 
pragmatic, result-oriented" (EDU).  
 Causality: statements that define cause-and-effect relations between concepts. Ex-
amples: (1) "The product's decline is influenced by the customers" (IND); or: (2) 
"More students bring more resources" (EDU).  
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The theory is basically represented by the cognitive map format (Axelrod, 1976), which is 
limited to simple causality relations: variables, direction and ratio of influence. 
4.1.2 Initial condition 
These are specific qualitative values that are assigned to each of the primary forces in the 
cognitive map. By "qualitative" we mean high-low, increase-decrease or another contrasting 
pair (relative to the present state). The initial conditions do not reflect anticipation but possi-
bility, so each primary force is assigned twice, one value at a time. 
4.1.3 Scenarios 
The scenarios are the testing hypotheses. A scenario is the integrated conclusion, across all 
the variables, which is deduced from the cognitive map under a set of initial conditions (one 
initial condition per primary force). The deduction conforms to the cognitive map's rules, i.e. 
an arithmetic exercise along each path. A prohibitive attribute is regarded effective until fur-
ther notice, i.e. the ratio remains constant. It stems from the above that with n primary forces 
in the map there are as many scenarios as two to the power of n.  
4.1.4 Environment 
The "environment" stands for the actual values of all the variables included in the map, prima-
ry and non-primary alike, as observed in the real world. 
4.2 Model 
The model is adapted from Figure 1 and connects the constructs in a syllogistic structure: 
 
 
Figure 4. The design model 
The logical notation of the model5 is as follows: let T be the descriptive Theory, let C be a set 
of initial conditions (c1, c2…cn), let S be the scenario and let E be the environment. Then: 
  
 = 	
 →  ∗  ≠ 
 →  
 
                                                     
5 This is an adaptation of Popper's formula:  → 
 ∗ ̅ → ;̅ in words: "if p is derivable from t, and 
if p is false, then t also is false" (Popper, 1961, p. 76). Whilst this formula applies the course of pro-
hibition, the one developed here applies the course of initial conditions. 
Descriptive Theory 
Scenario 
Environment 
AND Initial conditions 
Testing & falsification   
Derivation  
Major premise 
Minor premise 
Result 
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This reads: if the Theory, under initial conditions equal to the actual conditions in the envi-
ronment, yields the scenario S, and if the scenario S is not materialized in (is unequal to) the 
environment, then the Theory is false (not-T). 
4.3 Method 
In addition to the logical requirements, the design has to cope with the "Falsification obstruct-
er" along the route, namely mindless derivation and mental irrefutability. It is the duty of the 
method to confront them. 
The method presents a two-phase procedure6: formalization and testing; the former establish-
es the platform for the latter. Table 7 spreads the techniques that assemble the method by 
phase and by the addressed obstructer; hereinafter the techniques are detailed. 
Table 7. The method: techniques by phase and obstruction 
Phase 
Obstruction 
Formalization Testing 
Mindless derivation Elicitation, explication and 
systematization of the 
Theory. 
Exhaustive and 
comprehensive derivation of 
the deducible scenarios. 
Genuine and risky testing of 
the Theory. 
Mental irrefutability Exclusive focus on the "area 
of net interest" (detached 
from the normative and the 
design Theories). 
Predefined hypotheses. 
Observations of basic 
statements.  
 
FORMALIZATION 
Mindless derivation 
Elicitation, explication and systematization of the Theory: the elicitation of the Theory 
builds on two techniques in combination. One is the panel questioning method employed by 
Roberts (1976)7, aimed at constructing a cognitive map. The panel undergoes three rounds: 
1. In the first round an assortment of variables is freely suggested, individually by each 
of the participants. 
2. In the second round the variables are rated, integrated and clustered, as the outcome 
of collective consideration (which, Roberts testifies, is extremely uneasy). 
3. In the third round the variables are interrelated and the relations are notated with posi-
tive or negative signs. 
The panel method is amended according to the different purpose: instead of distant observers 
who are questioned after the fact we interview the decision-makers themselves in real-time.  
                                                     
6
 It is a practical contraction of Popper's (1961, pp. 32-33) four phases: consistency, logicality, signifi-
cance and confirmation. 
7
 This is one of the two unobtrusive techniques that Axelrod (1976) mentions. The panel consists of 
uninvolved experts and is conducted after the fact. 
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The other technique is the laddering interview, which "refers to an in-depth, one-on-one in-
terviewing technique used to develop an understanding of how consumers translate the attrib-
utes of products into meaningful associations with respect to self, following Means-End theo-
ry" (Reynolds & Gutman, 1988, p. 12). We borrow the essential idea (to expose the attributes 
behind the causation) with one technical adaptation: a panel instead of personal interviews.  
Beyond this, the explication is attained through the visualization of the verbal expressions in 
the cognitive map. The systematization concerns the distinction between the three types of 
statements, followed by: (1) aligning the attributes with the respective causalities, and (2) as-
suring the variableness of the causal relationships. 
Exhaustive and comprehensive derivation of the deducible scenarios: the scenarios reflect 
neither discretion nor anticipation; they are strictly derived from the map and encompass all 
the possibilities that the Theory allows. The exhaustiveness is achieved as each primary force 
is assigned with both poles of its spectrum, one at a time, where each assignment generates 
another scenario. The comprehensiveness is attained as each scenario integrates all the paths 
across the map. 
The comprehensiveness enhances the scenario's falsifiability, in line with the Popperian prin-
ciple of logical probability (Popper, 1961). The principle reads that the more conditions a 
theory has to meet, the less it is probable; the less it is probable, the more it is falsifiable – 
hence a better theory. 
Mental irrefutability 
Exclusive focus on the area of interest: the key countermeasure against the mental irrefuta-
bility is the distance from its sources: the normative and the design Theories. For the formali-
zation of this technique we borrow a military concept. 
The Western military doctrine
8
 divides the battlefield into two areas (Figure 5):  
1. "An area of influence is a geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable 
of influencing operations by maneuver and fire support systems normally under the 
commander’s command or control. The area of influence normally surrounds and in-
cludes the area of operations." 
2. "An area of interest is that area of concern to the commander, including the area of in-
fluence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of 
current or planned operations. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces 
who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission." 
 
 
Figure 5. The organization and the areas of influence, interest and no-interest 
                                                     
8
 The following excerpts are from "Operations", FM (Field Manual) 3-0, US Department of the Army, 
p. 5-5 (http://www.army.mil/fm3-0/fm3-0.pdf ), visited April 10, 2010. 
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Save the "geographical", "fire" and "enemy", these concepts hold for civil organizations ana-
logically. Our focus is on the dotted area, i.e. the area of interest excluding the area of influ-
ence (hereinafter: area of net interest). The sources of mental irrefutability are much less ef-
fective in the area of net interest: the no-control eliminates the "self-sealing" and the respon-
sibility effects; the distance neutralizes the enactment; and the noninvolvement blunts the 
availability bias. To borrow from Axelrod (1976), the unobtrusiveness enhances the reliabil-
ity. 
The open-ended area beyond the area-of-interest is by default of no-interest (irrelevance); this 
is the zone of "there is unawareness". We have to confirm this statement in order to falsify the 
statement "there is no unawareness", which is equivalent to: "the outer envelope of the area-
of-interest is true". 
The rule for the inner envelope (i.e. the distant border of the area-of-influence) is "one up": 
the first variable that affects the industry, where the industry is one level above the subject 
organization. Preferably this variable (hereinafter: First cross-industry force) is beyond the 
industry's accumulated influence, i.e. insensitive to competitive maneuvers (for the sake of net 
interest). 
Subject to these guidelines, the map is schematized in Figure 6; note that the primary forces 
are distinguished by bold letters. 
 
 
Figure 6. Schematic view of the Theory (the boundaries of the areas are for 
illustration) 
By applying the "Exhaustive and comprehensive derivation of the deducible scenarios" tech-
nique on the map, the following schema9 emerges (Figure 7): 
 
                                                     
9 The graphical presentation is borrowed from Barabba (1998). 
First cross-industry 
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 17
 
Figure 7. The circle of scenarios derivable from the Theory  
TESTING 
Mindless derivation 
Genuine and risky testing of the Theory: this is the kernel of method. The testing procedure 
is conducted every 6-12 months, assuming that detectable changes require that time to evolve. 
The evaluator identifies the actual state of the primary forces in the environment, and singles 
out the scenario that has been assigned accordingly. Then the scenario, variable by variable, is 
compared to the real environment. A mismatch of one or more variable falsifies the Theory 
(or part of it). 
For example (consider Figure 6): we look at the environment and conclude that, since the last 
test (or the theory's formalization), primary forces 1 and 2 have increased; therefore, if the 
theory is true, scenario 1 (Figure 7) should match the environment. We compare the real val-
ues of driving forces 3-5 and the "First cross-industry force" to those predicted by the scenar-
io; a mismatch of any of them falsifies the Theory. 
Mental irrefutability 
Predefined hypotheses: the reason for predefining all the scenarios in advance rather than 
deriving the respective scenario in real-time (i.e. upon the test) is to prevent the "flexible en-
vironment" syndrome. We suspect that a derivation after the fact enables a flexible adaptation 
of the scenario to the reality or a retrospective justification thereof (as noticed in IND). The 
predefined scenarios force the decision makers to confront their original hypotheses and (with 
the next technique) amplify the inter-subjective objectivity of the method. 
Observations of basic statements: Popper (1961) expects the observations to convey basic 
statements, i.e. "a statement of a singular fact". Unfortunately most of the theory's substance 
consists of social artifacts (e.g. "prestige") or abstract concepts (e.g. "competition"). If, as 
Popper argues, the observation at the nature is theory-laden, all the more so when the ob-
served is an abstract concept (Hines, 1988). The interpretation of such observations is a con-
ventionalist trap, Popper (1961) warns, since as conventionalists – 
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…we may adopt a sceptical attitude as to the reliability of the experimenter 
whose observations, which threaten our system, we may exclude from sci-
ence on the ground that they are insufficiently supported, unscientific, or not 
objective, or even on the ground that the experimenter was a liar (Popper, 
1961, p. 81). 
As a countermeasure we require that the scenarios will be dissected down to the level of ex-
pected occurrences, i.e. basic statements. For example: "more than three competitors" and not 
"tough competition". The benefit is threefold: first, to focus the observations on empirical 
facts in the environment; second, to prompt undisputable comparisons between the scenario 
and the reality; third, to share common language across multiple sources (e.g. the media), and 
by that to obtain diversity. 
4.4 Instantiation (Work Plan) 
The method will be implemented in both participants with the researcher's facilitation. Once 
the Theory, the map and the scenarios are constructed, we will run the testing 2-3 times per 
participant, and evaluate. Next we will specify the learning. 
Following are the participant-specific arrangements upon which we have agreed: 
IND: the research will be conducted in the SBU level, namely twice, simultaneously. This 
was the management's preference in light of the different environment assumed for each SBU. 
Each SBU will involve the local management team, about 3-4 persons. One executive (the 
CTO) will represent the HQ in both SBUs, in order to synthesize the final evaluation. Testing 
is due approximately every six months. 
EDU: the research will involve the strategic committee, a body assembled of the management 
plus several senior incumbents (in total about 20 persons). The president will sponsor the re-
search and will evaluate its outcomes. Testing is due once a year. 
5 FINALIZING THE FIRST CYCLE 
5.1 Action Taking 
IND 
As planned, this phase of the research has been delegated to the SBU level and started in both 
SBUs quite simultaneously; unfortunately, SBU2 had been closed short before the research 
was completed, but nevertheless enriched the findings. For that reason and for the sake of 
brevity, only the products of SBU1 are presented, whilst the methodological insights integrate 
both experiments (which were by and large identical). 
SBU1 develops equipment for broadband video streaming over phone lines, which enables 
phone companies ("Telco's") to supply television services. This ability is part of the "triple 
play", a strategy in which telephone, internet and television are supplied by a single provider. 
In this playground the Telco's (as of 2003) competed against the cable companies. For IND 
this is a demand market, directed by a limited number of customers with a great buying power 
each. 
Formalization  
Theory construction: we started the formalization phase with the Theory's elicitation, expli-
cation and systematization. The first round yielded about 15 variables, which were consoli-
dated upon the second round into eight (12 in SBU2). The Theory construction consumed the 
largest time share, about 9 hours in 3 sessions. Two steps were particularly problematic: one 
concerned the designation of the "First cross-industry force", which was confused with the 
unit's own ends. Finally the decision was "Telco's broadband television (BTV) supply"; this 
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variable was assumed uncontrolled by the industry still with a direct effect on the competi-
tion, i.e. the area of influence. 
The same difficulty was encountered by SBU2, whose products are consumed by plenty of 
anonymous end-users in the free market. The "First cross-industry force" they named was the 
size of the market, clearly beyond the control of each single competitor. 
Once the "First cross-industry force" was agreed upon, the designation of the farther forces 
was straightforward. The second difficulty (in both units) emerged upon systematization, and 
was twofold: to name a variable rather than a state (e.g. "economic situation", not "reces-
sion"), and to assure the levelness of the causal relationships; close supervision of the re-
searcher was required. 
Testing 
We conducted testing sessions every 6-10 months. The first two were indecisive, since the 
changes in the environment (primary and other forces) were too marginal to reach conclu-
sions. The change in the work process, however, was salient: the environmental scanning was 
data-oriented, strictly focused on the indicators listed above; disagreements around observa-
tions were scarce.  
The third session, that took place two years after the formalization, was different. The actual 
state of the primary forces indicated scenario 2 (Investment), but the environment partly re-
sembled scenario 3 (Waiting) whilst the rest did not respect any scenario. Specifically, the 
Telco's invested very little in BTV equipment (part of the Waiting scenario) and cooperated 
with the cellular companies on content initiatives (not mentioned in any scenario). Apparently 
the Theory has been falsified. 
The Theory was reviewed in attempt to specify the fallacy. One participant pointed to the 
missing of the emerging High-Definition (HD) technology, which he thought had caused the 
Telco's to wait until it would be assimilated, but there was no consensus about it. Another par-
ticipant insisted that the Theory was not falsified al all, since the HD is wrapped in the "tech-
nology change" force, already in the Theory. Yet she acknowledged that the "delay" attached 
to the "technology change" variable was much longer than originally assumed. The debate 
would not be settled until the next session. 
The fourth and last session was held after another eight months. The environment-scenarios 
contradiction continued, but much more disturbing was the results input: the company lags 
behind its objectives. Now the acknowledgement of a problem was unanimous. The bottom 
line is that a new driving force, claimed critical, emerged in the design Theory but was denied 
upon the descriptive Theory (that is, only the design Theory was falsified). The reaction to 
this discovery was: "it is a logical movement [in the market]… but I don't understand what we 
are trying to prove; this is the regular evolution in this industry". 
EDU 
As planned, the research involved the entire strategic committee, and was integrated in the 
strategic thinking process as its starter. 
Formalization  
There was an instant consensus around the "First cross-industry force", which reads "Demand 
for engineering education in colleges"; it directly affects the first variable within the area of 
influence, which is "Demand for studying in EDU". It is important to note that very few engi-
neering colleges existed at the time, quite distant from one another, so the interest-influence 
border was thin. 
Upon systematization, the IND-like difficulty with the levelness along the causal relationships 
was realized and required facilitation. The plenary session lasted about 15 hours, to which the 
teams' working time should be added.  
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The governing mindset along the formalization process held a competitive arena consisting of 
two groups: the universities on one hand and a few colleges on the other. The emanating 
strategy reflected this perception. 
Testing 
We conducted testing sessions once a year. In the first session scenario 4 was materialized 
without contradictions; save the insight that the effect of Pace of knowledge renewal is slower 
than assumed, the Theory was corroborated.  
In the second session (two years after formalization) the economic situation turned up, so 
(with the "Slow pace of knowledge renewal" still) the actual conditions singled out scenario 
3; however, the scenario did not fit the environment. Despite the evidenced increase in de-
mand, the engineering colleges (IND included) have not grown.  
The reaction to this finding was spontaneous: the Theory is false; and the pointing to the false 
assumption was as quick: 
The competition among the colleges became tougher, and the larger amount 
of students is distributed across more institutions.  
In other words, the colleges-universities allocations ratio is no more a factor; instead the sig-
nificant ratio is of the colleges that provide engineering education to the colleges in total
10
. It 
is noteworthy that despite the intensive attention paid to the strategy throughout the period 
(and the explicit reliance of the strategy on the Theory), the falsity has not been noticed but 
upon the testing.  
The falsification had an instant impact on the strategy, which was revised in line with the up-
dated Theory. With that the phase ended. 
Evaluation 
Constructs 
The Theory: we regard the completeness criterion as equivalent to the validity of the cogni-
tive map; in this sense the criterion is partly satisfied. IND's participants accentuated the au-
thenticity of the knowledge representation. The understandability was acknowledged by both 
participants: IND highlighted the clarity of the causal relations and EDU emphasized the 
common language gained through the mapping. The Theory appeared simple as well: around 
10 variables, easy to represent and grasp. The structure-attribute-causality distinction is ex-
haustive and mutually-exclusive (i.e. complete) and understandably represented. 
The negative aspect is that the Theory inherits the limitations embedded in the cognitive map; 
especially inflictive is the lacking time dimension (duration). The weak representation of du-
ration was encountered in both implementations: in IND it concerned the "Technology 
change", and in EDU the "Knowledge renewal". The IND case demonstrates the damage of 
that limitation: it "mitigates" the falsity of the Theory and postpones the falsification. For ex-
ample, the environment-scenario contradiction upon session 3 was explained that way: "There 
is no problem, this is the reality. The Telco BTV supply increases, slowly though, because the 
Technology change is lengthy".  
As for the other limitations, the need for nonmonolithic expression is exemplified by IND's 1
st
 
scenario: "Under extreme circumstances the trend turns over", a relation that the Theory can-
not exhibit. In the Theory of SBU2, which is not presented, we faced the need for Conditional 
or interactive causation: where one variable enables another one but does not drive it. 
                                                     
10
 What happened was that the CHE has granted many colleges an engineering degree. Consequently 
the supply outnumbered the demand, although more than half the students learned in colleges. 
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In summary, the simplicity of the map is gained at the expense of its completeness, but the 
understandability is still fair; the limitations do not exceed the expectations. 
The initial conditions stand all the criteria but ease of use: as happened in IND, a long time 
was required before they could render a meaningful, testable change. This limitation is inher-
ent. 
The scenarios meet all the criteria, especially the ease-of-use: no further contemplation is 
required thanks to the structured derivation from the Theory. 
The environment construct meets all the criteria. 
Model 
The criteria concern internal and external validity (internal consistency and fidelity with the 
real world, respectively). The internal consistency is a priori, follows from the logical formal-
ism; in contrast, the fidelity with the real world requires empirical evidence. This point is con-
troversial. 
Prima facie the answer is yes: each instance of S≠E (scenario unequal to environment) indi-
cated a falsity in the Theory. Yet the participants' perceptions are contrasted. IND's evaluation 
questions both the reliability of the observations and the validity of the scenarios ("the argu-
ment that certain indicators signify a specific scenario, or that the Theory dictates only these 
and not other scenarios, may be incorrect"). In EDU, the opposite is true: "the scenarios' ex-
amination supports the Theory's falsification – and indeed, that's what happened". 
So there is an "apparent disagreement" to explain (will be done upon "Specifying learning"). 
Method 
Clarification: in this section we evaluate the procedure; the impact on the user is examined in 
the next section. 
The method is operational, effective and efficient, but weak upon the ease-of-use criterion. 
The techniques vary by contribution to each criterion. 
There is unanimous agreement about the effectiveness of the Elicitation and explication of the 
Theory, yet with a different emphasis. EDU's president highlighted the elicitation as an eye-
opening vehicle:  
The "Pace of knowledge renewal" is a variable that I did not notice before, as 
well as the "Economic situation". They definitely were not in my mind. The 
"Dominance of the values approach in education" issue was also unclear to 
me. In retrospect, it might have been the most significant discovery. 
IND's participants were more satisfied with the explication, since in their opinion the elicita-
tion was trivial. They liked the analytical modeling, the visual representation and the ampli-
fied awareness of the relationships granted by the analysis. They had two reservations: one, 
that not all the attributes had been unveiled; two, that the process was too long and too frag-
mented.  
On the other hand, the systematization was difficult and required tight facilitation. The ladder-
ing interview was efficient in extracting the attributes, but neither this nor the levelness of the 
causal relations could be reached without the researcher's involvement. 
There was wide agreement about the effectiveness of the Observations of basic statements. 
Both participants noted that their scanning became much more focused and targeted. For ex-
ample, in IND: "I gained much higher awareness of what to look around"; in EDU, the presi-
dent stated: 
 22
The Theory's explication definitely sharpened my information needs. I notice 
elements previously unattended to. 
The Exhaustive and comprehensive derivation of the deducible scenarios was efficient, and 
remarkably easy. As of the effectiveness, we may ask whether the "attributionalization" tactic 
applied on the steady forces violates the rule. The results show a positive balance, as the tactic 
does not undermine the logical line whilst is clearly more practical. In total the earned effi-
ciency pays off.    
The Exclusive focus on the "area of net interest" was effective, although counterintuitive for 
the participants. A special attention by a trained facilitator is required in order to keep the fo-
cus on track. The effectiveness is expressed by elimination: we did not encounter normative 
resistance when the Theory was falsified. The Predefined hypotheses, which the participants 
had to confront, contributed to that end as well. 
The core technique of Genuine and risky testing of the Theory is also operational and effi-
cient. The testing procedure succeeded to differentiate between corroboration and falsification 
of the Theory. However, the participants varied upon the ease-of-use of the testing and the 
understanding of its consequences (more about it shortly). 
The similar results across organizations as varied as IND and EDU suggest that the method 
stands the criterion of generality. 
Instantiation 
We witnessed two different impacts of the method on the users: 
 In IND, the design Theory is falsified whilst the parallel falsification of the descrip-
tive Theory is denied; in other words, there is no mirroring. The strategy corresponds 
with the design Theory alone. 
 In EDU, the descriptive Theory is falsified; the falsification is simultaneously pro-
jected on the design Theory, and the strategy is revised accordingly. 
The participants evaluated the impact in light of their attitude. In IND: 
This is all about the way of thinking…. We did not feel that the analysis had 
added to our understanding of the reality; we understand the reality anyway 
and know what is going on. We intuitively understand that there are these and 
other driving forces, and the forces are conceptualized in our mind. We think 
differently from the method: we notice that we do not sell and ask ourselves 
what the problem was. We definitely don't look for answers form the [de-
scriptive] Theory. We take for granted some future scenarios and after the 
fact try to explain what was wrong. Even if the [descriptive] Theory is true, 
that does not guarantee the validity of the strategy. 
Since the strategy obtains its validity from the design Theory, the last sentence denies the mir-
roring between the descriptive and the design Theories. 
In EDU: 
I [the president] have no doubt that the idea of "reality control" is right. As a 
manager I apply the scientific logic through process flowcharts [i.e. design 
Theory]. The method reminds us that science also means falsification [of the 
descriptive Theory], and in issues as central as strategy the hypotheses' test-
ing is literally a must. The scenarios' examination supports the Theory's falsi-
fication – and indeed, that's what happened, fortunately still in time. After all 
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we are an academic institute, and our managerial attitude should be scientific 
as well. 
In short he says: as a manager I lean on the design Theory; as a scientist I concern the descrip-
tive Theory; the method connects both worlds. 
Specifying Learning 
In this section we theorize about the disagreements; in order to separate them we highlight the 
agreements first. 
Agreements 
Agreements were reached about the constructs and the method. Two aspects share a wide 
agreement in particular: 
1. The contribution of the Theory's explication. 
2. The effectiveness of the honed environmental scanning that the testing orientation 
dictates. 
Disagreements 
Two disagreements were detected, relating to: 
1. The model, concerning its fidelity with the real world. 
2. The instantiation and the inter-Theory mirroring. 
The first disagreement is attitude-driven; IND's arguments indicate the entrenchment of the 
conventionalist (Kuhnian) stance. For us it signifies that the method failed to bridge the atti-
tude gap. 
The second disagreement suggests that the mirroring, again in IND, is not as straightforward 
as assumed. Common to both disagreements is IND's resistance against EDU's acceptance of 
the method. The deliberate diversity of participants was aimed at such occasion, so we ask 
which organizational idiosyncrasy could cause the differences. 
A hint in this direction is EDU's testimony: "As a manager I apply the scientific logic through 
process flowcharts. The method reminds us that science also means falsification […] After all 
we are an academic institute, and our managerial attitude should be scientific as well". This 
means: the scientific orientation drives both the not-to-be-conventionalist decision and the 
comprehension of the mirroring. 
On that basis we theorize that (unless uniquely scientific-oriented) organizations face one 
more falsification obstructer between the descriptive and the design Theories. Since the Theo-
ries are claimed to mirror each other, we name the added obstructer the "Broken mirror" (fig-
ure 8). 
The consequences of this theory on the second cycle are: 
1. The intervention has to incorporate "scientific indoctrination". 
2. The method has to take into account the "Broken mirror" obstructer. 
3. Unlike EDU's uniqueness, the participant organization should not be scientific-
oriented (but not too similar to IND).  
The process hypothesis is updated accordingly (the update is underlined): 
H2. The techniques employed throughout the method overcome the "mindless deriva-
tion", the "mental irrefutability" and the "Broken mirror" falsification obstructers. 
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Note that the agreements relate to H1 (the environment). In the second cycle (described in the 
next chapter) the agreements are retested and the disagreements are explained through H2. 
Figure 8 below updates the theory. 
 
 
Figure 8. The Falsification Obstructers theory, updated 
6. ACTION RESEARCH, CYCLE II 
6.1 The Participant 
Cycle II involved one participant: a software company nicknamed SOFT. The cycle was con-
ducted during 2009, a year of which the first half was shadowed by the economic recession. 
SOFT is a small Israeli private company, of about 20 employees, which is owned and run by 
its founder. The company specializes in IBM collaboration products and is an official IBM 
business partner. SOFT provides the full range of IT services including sales, development, 
implementation and maintenance. The company targets the enterprise market, usually for en-
during contracts. 
SOFT shares the business orientation of IND, but differs by size, structure and industry – 
hence an eligible participant. As the same important was the full-hearted willingness to partic-
ipate. 
SOFT's CEO (identified hereinafter as B') accepted my request to join the research for defi-
nitely the sake of curiosity. She received an explanation about the study, its theoretical ground 
and objectives, the action-research method, and was briefed about the 1
st
 cycle. B' preferred 
not to involve subordinates in the research, because of their workload (a side-effect of the 
tough economic situation). Anyway, she stressed, nothing in the company is beyond her su-
pervision. 
B' has over 15 years of experience in the market, of which the last five in SOFT and the rest 
as a salaried senior executive in a larger company. A prominent characteristic of this particu-
lar market (in Israel) is its stability – mild competition among very few providers; B' is among 
the most experienced veterans. 
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6.2 Diagnosis 
The normative and the design Theories were readily articulated; their utterances are quite of-
ten interwoven. Three underlying motifs can be extracted: 
1. The tight, long lasting relations with the customer. The family metaphor is salient, 
epitomized by the repeated usage of the term "Catholic marriage". The firm believes 
in trust-based relations, long-run considerations and personal contacts. 
2. The need-driven approach: the right way is to make the customer feel that he sensed 
the problem and then to respond with a solution. The motto is "need from the field". 
3. The conservative, safe-bets attitude, which prefers flexible cooperative contracts 
whenever it is possible rather than bold investments. 
Whilst the third principle is a tentative reaction to the economic constellation, the first two 
reflect a long-standing tradition which is to stay. 
Unlike the solidness of these both Theories, the other constructs are sparse. The descriptive 
Theory mentions only concepts or attributes whilst empty of causality. No scenarios are men-
tioned save one: the IBM-conducted future; and the environment is a closed vendors-
distributers
11
-customers loop.  
The expressions explain why these constructs are unheeded. First, the firm restricts its atten-
tion to the IBM environment, which is considered tightly regulated (by IBM). Second, there 
assumed to be enough sensors within this environment, so changes are anyway detectable. 
Third, "the business in which I operate is a very inexact science", so intuition or feelings are 
as the same valuable as a systematic surveillance. Forth, the results justify the attitude. 
In summary, two problems are diagnosed in SOFT: 
1. The Theory is static (no causality) and strictly confined; no attention is paid to the 
wider environment. 
2. The sole validation method is the results control. 
The scenarios' falsification obstructers do not apply since there are no scenarios. 
6.3 Action Planning 
Based on cycle 1 we added the "Broken mirror" as a falsification obstructer. In order to re-
mirror we revise the method whilst the constructs and the model remain unchanged. 
Method  
The revision concerns the first formalization technique: instead of plain Elicitation, the tech-
nique consists of Structured mirroring, explication and systematization of the descriptive 
Theory. This is done in the following order: 
1. Explication of the design Theory, with which the participant ought to be familiar. 
2. Structured mirroring of the descriptive Theory through laddering, i.e. asking what ra-
tionalizes the design Theory. 
3. Completion of the explication and systematization steps. 
The remaining techniques still apply, except that the area-of-interest principle becomes more 
delicate; this is because the mirroring necessarily concerns the area-of-influence, so the sys-
tematization has to clear out the superfluous range. 
                                                     
11
 For distinction, IBM and Microsoft are labeled "vendors" and the secondary-market companies (like 
SOFT) are referred to as "distributers". 
 26
Instantiation 
The method will be implemented in SOFT with the researcher's facilitation. Once the Theory 
and the scenarios are constructed, we will run the testing every 6 months until we can sub-
stantiate an evaluation. Next we will specify the learning. 
The CEO is the single participant, as agreed upon the researcher-client agreement. 
6.4 Action Taking 
Formalization 
Once the design Theory was explicated, we applied the structured mirroring technique. We 
departed from two major themes in the design Theory and went on toward the theory formali-
zation through an extensive use of the structured mirroring technique. 
Testing 
The first testing was conducted 10 months later (4 months beyond schedule). The initial con-
ditions have changed remarkably enough for determining the materialized scenario. We re-
viewed the scenario and the mismatch with the environment was conspicuous: more than half 
the indicators were not observed. B' immediately inferred that the Theory was falsified and 
started re-theorizing. We conducted the evaluation right after the testing. 
6.5 Evaluation 
Constructs 
There are no new insights regarding this aspect. 
Model 
The empirical evidence for fidelity was reconfirmed. Concerning the disagreement about the 
users' acceptance, SOFT took EDU's side, and commented after the testing: "I accept the 
model… It made me critical. I can recognize that [the reality] is unlike [the scenario], and 
then I wonder why: because we have failed to take that [force] into account". 
More than that, it was already upon the formalization when B' stated: "this scenario is less 
probable but still is possible [according to the Theory]. These two scenarios oppose one an-
other but both are logically possible. If we face a contradiction [between the environment and 
the scenario] we will know that the Theory is failed or that some factor is missing". 
Method 
The revised technique (Structured mirroring, explication and systematization of the Theory) 
is operational: it worked to extract the descriptive Theory. But simple it is not, so the mirror-
ing requires tight facilitation.  
The other techniques were reemployed and were effective as before (including the worrisome 
Exclusive focus on the "area of net interest"), so the claim for generality holds. 
Last but not least: the cycle reaffirms the low score on the ease-of-use criterion. The re-
searcher's assistance was required throughout the whole process.  
Instantiation 
The impact on the participant was immediate. The Theory's falsification was crystal clear and 
the participant accepted it with no reservations. Two consequences followed: 
 The participant retrieved previous cues she had encountered and reinterpreted them in 
light of the revised Theory: "I did not react to those signals. I have never thought 
 27
about it that way; but now… because of the freeware [concept], all these signals make 
sense". 
 She instantly mirrored the Theories, this time in the design direction: "I understand 
that it means some [strategic] change… I have to think what I can do about it". 
Later she announced her intention to reiterate the process a year later. 
6.6 Specifying Learning 
The agreements reached upon the first cycle were reconfirmed, concerning the constructs and 
the method.  
The specific hypothesis targeted in this cycle, i.e. the "Broken mirror" obstructer, was corrob-
orated from two directions: 
1. The obstructer was detected upon formalization. 
2. Once the method was adapted according to that hypothesis, the disagreements en-
countered in the former cycle were settled.  
Overall conclusions are discussed in the next (and last) chapter. 
7 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 Discussion 
An essential part of the discussion – that is, the method evaluation – was carried out at the 
respective phase in the research. In this section we discuss additional issues beyond strict 
evaluation. 
The applicability of the method 
All the three participants experienced difficulties during the method's implementation. The 
difficulties culminated toward formalization and diminished towards the testing, being the 
systematization the most problematic. The need for specialized facilitation was evident; even 
a participant as science-oriented as EDU could not handle the theorization independently. It 
seems unreasonable that the method can be prescribed as a recipe. 
However, this is not an exception. Many management tools require professional escort and 
still are ubiquitous (e.g. ISO, balanced score card, or dialectic inquiry). Whilst this difficulty 
is surmountable, more troubling was the normative resistance that the managers demonstrated 
against the root idea: to pursue unknown problems. The common stance was that the already-
known problems were enough. 
A typical reaction in IND indicated that the problem recognition phase is beyond the man-
agement attention: "our thinking order is: what's the problem, to whom the problem may con-
cern, how many profits can a solution yield, and which share of it we can seize". EDU pre-
sented a similar reaction, although not as blatant: the post-falsification strategic revision was 
soon halted; in the president's opinion it happened because the problem was not yet a crisis 
when recognized. 
SOFT's CEO commented that "without a crisis managers do not check their paradigms" (she 
wished she was exceptional); Mintzberg et al (1976) reached the same conclusion four dec-
ades ago. The attitude (as Popper claimed) is the root obstructer and the main disabler, not the 
difficulty of the method. 
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Scenarios 
The concept of scenarios is a known and popular management tool (used by 42% of the re-
spondents to Bain & Company's survey, 200912). A by-product of the method, beyond the fal-
sification function, is the improvement of this tool per se. 
First, in the management literature the Theory and the scenarios are interwoven and undistin-
guishable (this is what the mindless derivation is about). The traditional generation of scenar-
ios is dialectic and yields a three-tenet, eclectic construct; Schoemaker (1993) counts the 
three: "[scenarios] may present antithetical world views. In terms of inquiring systems 
(Churchman, 1971), scenarios are Hegelian in their underlying philosophical premise […] 
The gist of the scenario method seems that it is many things: art and science, deduction and 
induction, structure and fluid…" (p. 194). In contrast, the method we suggest produces sce-
narios with a coherent orientation: scientific, deductive and structured.  
Second, the traditional method substitutes the answer for the question. Schoemaker (1995) 
asks and answers: "How can you determine if your final scenarios are any good? The first 
criterion is relevance" (p. 30). Our stance is that the relevance is the very question, and the 
"goodness" concerns the Theory from which the scenarios are deduced. 
Third, the traditional scenarios presuppose the interactions of the firm with its environment 
(Schoemaker, 1995), thus are sensitive to enactment; our method enables a better distinction. 
The cognitive mapping 
Axelrod (1976) limits the cognitive map to represent only the causal Theory; other sorts of 
Theory are excluded. The virtue of the limitation is the map's unequivocalness: "The more 
types of images, arguments, and assertions that are allowed into the map, the less chance that 
the map can be coded the same way by two different coders" (Axelrod, 1976, p. 260). Since 
in our instance the "coder" is the Theory holder (rather than a third party), we are exempted 
from this limitation. In this sense we introduced the attribute, which as a constraint on causal-
ity enhances the Theory's falsifiability.  
Beyond causal representation, the method promotes concept formation (recall SOFT's decom-
position of "reliability"). It is a by-product of the cognitive mapping notion that extends its 
functionality. 
7.2 Conclusions 
The research objectives 
The research objectives were announced as follows: 
1. To explicate the Popperian face of organizations in order to posit a competing theory 
to the inadequacy argument. 
2. To corroborate the competing theory and by that to supplant the inadequacy argu-
ment. 
3. To counteract the unawareness problem. 
The first objective was attained through the literature review. Based on fragments of Popperi-
an-like manners the falsification obstructers theory was introduced. Toward the second objec-
tive we derived three hypotheses from the theory and designed an organizational method 
aimed at their testing. The first hypothesis (twofold) concerns the environment: 
H1a. The organization's environment can be theorized in a falsifiable fashion. 
                                                     
12
http://www.bain.com/bainweb/publications/publications_detail.asp?id=27075&menu_url=publication
s%5Fresults%2Easp; visited April 9, 2010. 
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H1b. The right route is capable of obtaining unequivocal falsification. 
This hypothesis was confirmed across both cycles. As for the second hypothesis that concerns 
the organization, its first version was challenged upon the first cycle. The source for the con-
flict was hypothesized and the pertinent technique was revised toward retesting. The essence 
of the update is that the "right route" is ineffective unless explicitly connected to the left 
route. The updated hypothesis reads:  
H2. The techniques employed throughout the method overcome the "mindless derivation", 
the "mental irrefutability" and the "Broken mirror" falsification obstructers. 
The hypothesis was tested and confirmed upon the second cycle. The ultimate objective is 
attained through the falsification route that H2 indicates (figure 9). The act of re-mirroring 
(signified by the black dot) engenders the interface between the Popperian and the organiza-
tional conceptualizations. 
 
 
Figure 9. The organization's "Theoretical System" and the falsification route (marked 
by the thick arrow) 
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